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DETERMINATIVE STATUTE/RULE 
Utah Code Annotated, Section 35-1-67(1988) and 35-1-77(1)(a) 
(1988) are the determinative statutes in this case. Rule R490-1-9 
and R490-1-17 of the Industrial Commission's Administrative Rules 
are also applicable.1 They are set forth in full in the Addendum 
hereto as EXHIBIT A. 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
All parties agree that this Court's review of the Industrial 
Commission decision is governed by the Utah Administrative 
Procedures Act, Utah Code Annotated Section 63-46b-16(4)(1988). 
Respondents, however, have misconstrued the substantive basis of 
Petitioner's challenges to the Industrial Commission decision. 
Petitioner has challenged the Commission's use of the "significant 
cause" standard for awarding permanent, total disability 
compensation as well as the Commission's failure to refer the 
medical causation issue to a Medical Panel. Those issues are pure 
questions of law and under the Administrative Procedures Act, the 
standard of appellate review which applies to such questions of law 
is "correction of error" and there is no deference to the agency's 
interpretation of the law. Utah Administrative Procedures Act, 
Unfortunately, the Briefs and previous Orders in this matter 
use R490-1-9 and R568-1-9 interchangeably as well as R490-1-17 and 
R568-1-17. The Commission simply changed the prefix of all "R490" 
rules to "R568" in 1992 but no substantive changes were made with 
respect to these two rules. Since the law in effect on October 31, 
1990, governs this matter, citations to R490-1-9 and R490-1-17 will 
be used herein. 
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Utah Code Annotated, Section 63-46b-16(4) (d) (1988). Mor-Flo 
Industries v. Board of Review. 817 P.2d 328 (Utah 1991). Morton 
International, Inc. v. Auditing Division of the Utah State Tax 
Commission, 814 P.2d 581 (Utah 1991). Respondent's reliance on 
Tasters LTD v. Dept. of Employment Security, 222 UAR 63 (Utah App. 
1993), Wagstaff v. Dept. of Employment Security, 826 P.2d 1069 
(Utah App. 1992) is misplaced since there is no grant of discretion 
to the agency on the issues presently before the Court. 
Respondents also completely ignore the controlling principal 
of the Utah Workers Compensation Act — that it is to be liberally 
construed and that any doubt as to compensation is to be resolved 
in favor of the injured worker. State Tax Commission v. Industrial 
Commission, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 1984). McPhie v. Industrial 
Commission, 567 P.2d 153, 155 (Utah 1977). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS IN REPLY 
Respondents do not dispute that Petitioner suffered an 
industrial injury on October 31, 1990, that he has established the 
occurrence of an industrial accident and the required legal 
causation. They also do not dispute the Petitioner is presently 
permanently and totally disabled. Their only grounds of dispute is 
the specious argument that his industrial accident was not a 
"significant cause" of his admitted permanent, total disability 
status. 
Petitioner admits there are bits of evidence in his medical 
records to support the Administrative Law Judge's findings. 
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However, that evidence is neither significant nor substantial. In 
order t support the ALJ's findings, his medical records must be 
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record. The repeated chart note of Petitioner's initial treating 
physician, Glen Church, which the ALJ and Respondent hang their 
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April :^.. death. til le char t i lote which states in 
relevant part that Mr. Kleinsmith disabled due to "his age and 
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Whatever ambiguities existed in the record were clarified by 
Dr. Albrand's medical reports and the letter from Nancy Hughes at 
BRIEF OF PETITIONER). Said evidence showed that the 
Administrative Law Judge relied upon incomplete medical records and 
This case also presented "significant medical issues" which 
mandated the utilization of a Medical Panel under Industrial 
< a 
allowed an evaluation by expert, medically trained doctors who 
would have the Peti tioner/s entire medical record. The findings of 
1 - :: i in : :ii tj i 
this ground because they did not request and utilize ail of 
Petitioner's medical records when they made their finding of total 
This Court should summarily reverse the Industrial 
Commission1^ determination that Petitioner did not establish 
medical causation and remand with instructions to enter an award 
establishing that fact. In the alternative, this matter should be 
remanded with instructions to the Industrial Commission to convene 
a Medical Panel to examine the medical causation issue. 
ARGUMENT 
I 
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT THE 
PETITIONER WAS NOT PERMANENTLY. TOTALLY DISABLED DUE TO 
HIS INDUSTRIAL ACCIDENT. 
Respondent's allege that the Industrial Commission's Rules on 
permanent, total disability require that the Administrative Law 
Judge determine "if a significant cause of the disability is the 
Claimant's industrial accident or some other unrelated cause or 
causes. . ." Administrative Code R490-1-17(c). The error in 
Respondent's argument is that there is no provision in the Utah 
workers' compensation statutes that the industrial accident must be 
a "significant cause of the disability." Utah Code Annotated, 
Section 35-1-67, the statute governing permanent, total disability 
claims, does not contain any reference to a "significant cause" 
standard. Indeed, the statute merely requires that the Commission 
make a finding of disability "as measured by the substance of the 
sequential decision making process of the Social Security 
Administration. . . " 
This Court has recently determined that the Industrial 
Commission has erred in evaluating an injured worker's injury under 
the standard set forth in that Rule because the injured worker's 
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injury occurred after promulgation of the Rule. As the Court 
stated in Abel v. Industrial Commission, 221 UAR 15, 16 (Utah App. 
1993) : 
By focusing on the significant cause of Abel's 
disability, as provided by Rule R490-l-17(c) rather than 
evaluating Abel's claim under Section 35-1-67, the Board 
applied an incorrect standard and such ruling could not 
stand. 
This Court in Abel also expressed in a footnote that they were 
not expressing "any view as to whether Rule R490-l-17(c) falls 
within the Commission's rule-making authority or exceeds the same 
by imposing a 'significant cause' requirement." Id. at 17, 
Footnote 2. It is Petitioner's position that Rule R490-l-17(c) 
does exceed the Commission rule making authority by imposing the 
"significant cause" requirement and that such a requirement is 
unlawful and void. 
Although there is a certain grant of discretion to the Utah 
Industrial Commission, Section 35-1-67 requires that it make it's 
findings in conformance with the Social Security Administration 
sequential decision making process. There is no provision in the 
Social Security sequential decision making process which imposes 
the "significant cause" standard. By imposing such a standard, the 
Industrial Commission exceeded the grant of discretion granted to 
it by the Legislature. No agency, the Industrial Commission 
included, enjoys the discretion to exceed the authority vested in 
it by the Legislature. Tasters v. Dept. of Employment Security. 
Id. at 65. Hence, the Industrial Commission, having exceeded its 
authority, has its ruling reviewed for legal error, without 
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deference to the agency's findings. Utah Code Annotated Section 
63-46b-16(4)(d)(1989). LaSal Oil Company v. Dept. of Environmental 
Quality. 843 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Utah App. 1992). 
A review of Respondent's arguments show that they continue to 
select isolated and selected provisions from Petitioner's medical 
records to support their conclusions. The review of each of those 
records and the attendant conclusions contained therein is 
illuminating. 
A. The Social Security Determination - The Administrative 
Law Judge and the Industrial Commission placed great weight on the 
Social Security Administration's determination that Petitioner's 
permanent, total disability status was a result of his heart 
condition. However, Petitioner has proven that the SSA looked only 
at the cardiac problems and did not even review the records of Dr. 
Church in regards to the neck/back/upper extremities. It is clear 
from SSA Operations Supervisor Nancy Hughes' letter that, "the 
records of Dr. Church, the doctor for his neck/back/upper 
extremities were not considered so it may well be that he could 
have qualified for SSI benefits upon those problems as well.11 (R. 
at 12 6r and EXHIBIT D in BRIEF OF PETITIONER). 
The ALJ's and Industrial Commission's reliance upon the Social 
Security determination was in error and resulted in blatant, faulty 
fact finding. 
B. Dr. Church - Respondent's correctly acknowledge that Dr. 
Church, the Neurologist who treated Mr. Kleinsmith for his cervical 
problems, assessed a 20% permanent, partial impairment rating. 
6 
They vacuously assert that, "This is not a permanent, total 
disability." In fact, this is an incredulous statement. They 
cite absolutely no support for this assertion. The Industrial 
Commission has a long history of awarding permanent, total 
disability status to individuals with whole person impairments 
significantly less than 20%. Even the above cited case of Abel v. 
Industrial Commission, 221 UAR 15 (Utah App. 1993) involved an 
industrially related impairment of only 5% and subsequent award of 
permanent, total disability! Clearly an individual with a 2 0% 
disability may well be permanently and totally disabled, with or 
without combining other non-industrial impairments such as a heart 
condition. A 20% impairment to the spine is serious and may well 
be the straw that breaks the camel,s back. 
Indeed, as Petitioner has repeatedly pointed out, he was 
capable of working prior to his industrial accident and was not 
capable thereafter. Regardless of what other medical problems he 
may have had, it was the industrial accident which took him out of 
the work place. There is absolutely no support in any provision of 
his medical records for any contrary conclusion. 
C. Dr. Redd - Dr. Redd is the Cardiologist who treated 
Mr. Kleinsmith for his heart problems. Again, the critical 
determination is, "What took Mr. Kleinsmith out of the work force?" 
It was not his heart condition. Indeed, no doctor, Dr. Redd 
included, has ever made any mention that Mr. Kleinsmith should 
refrain from work due to his coronary condition following his 
second heart attack. He was already incapacitated and instructed 
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to be off work for the previous half year at the time of his heart 
attack on May 11, 1991. His coronary condition did not take him 
out of the work force. nor is it keeping him out. He was working 
with his coronary condition from 1984 (the date of his first, more 
serious, heart attack) to the date of his industrial accident, 
October 31, 1990. Under these circumstances, it is hard to follow 
the reasoning of the Commission and Respondent contending that he 
is permanently, totally disabled from his heart! 
D. Dr. Boyd Hoibrook - Dr. Holbrook's review of the medical 
records is less than complete and full, although he concludes that 
the industrial accident did not specifically cause any identifiable 
pathological process, and that it did not appear that any of the 
permanent impairment should be ascribed to the industrial accident 
of October of 1990, as the ultimate surgery was inevitable. Dr. 
Holbrook did not even meet with Mr. Kleinsmith and we have no way 
of knowing whether he based his opinion on a complete set of 
medical records. Even viewing the facts in favor of the 
Respondents, and ascribing a zero percent impairment due to the 
industrial accident, that is a striking difference to the 20% 
impairment specified by Dr. Church and compels the referral to a 
Medical Panel as argued below. 
E. Dr. Albrand Medical causation in this case was also 
provided by Petitioner's neurosurgeon Dr. Otmar W. Albrand. Dr. 
Albrand concretely and unambiguously established both legal and 
medical causation in his December 10, 1992 report where he remarks 
as follows: "It is my opinion that Mr. Kleinsmith is suffering 
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from injuries sustained 10-31-90 in an industrial accident and due 
to these injuries he's unable to return to substantial work or 
gainful employment." (R. at 127). HOW CAN MEDICAL AND LEGAL 
CAUSATION BE BETTER ESTABLISHED?! Petitioner cannot fathom a more 
succinct or bullet-proof statement by a doctor to establish both 
medical and legal causation. It is beyond belief that the ALJ, the 
Commission and the Respondent all totally ignore this smoking gun 
which shoots gaping holes through their position. 
Respondent highlights a minuscule amount of medical evidence 
in favor of the Industrial Commission's ruling which is grossly 
incomplete and legally insufficient. Petitioner, on the other 
hand, has marshalled all of the evidence, which mandates reversal 
of this case. The Petitioner's medical records, read as a whole, 
compel the conclusion that it was his industrial accident which 
removed him from the work force and not any of his other 
impairments, despite how significant they may be. This is the only 
logical conclusion. 
II 
THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION IN NOT 
REFERRING THIS MATTER TO A MEDICAL PANEL TO ASSIST IN THE 
RESOLUTION OF THE MEDICAL CAUSATION ISSUES, 
The Respondents have completely mis-analyzed this argument. 
Petitioner's argument is that Utah Code Annotated 35-1-
77(1)(a)(1988) and Utah Industrial Commission Rule R490-1-9 compel 
the submission of this dispute to a Medical Panel. Despite 
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Respondent's arguments to the contrary, such referral is not 
discretionary in this case. 
Although reference to a Medical Panel under Utah Code 
Annotated, Section 35-1-77 (1988) appears discretionary, that 
discretion is not unrestricted and has been made mandatory by the 
Commission's own Rules and Regulations (Utah Admin. Code R490-1-9). 
Ashcroft v. Industrial Commission, 855 P.2d 267 (Utah App. 1993). 
The failure to refer a matter to a Medical Panel when such 
referral is mandatory is plain error. "In some cases, such as where 
the evidence of causal connection between the work-related event 
and the injury is uncertain or highly technical, failure to refer 
the case to a medical panel may be an abuse of discretion." 
Champion Home Builders v. Industrial Commission, 703 P.2d 306, 308 
(Utah 1985). See also Hone v. J.F. Shea Co., 728 P.2d 1008 (Utah 
1986). 
Rule R490-1-9 requires that a panel "will" be used when "one 
or more significant medical issues may be involved." The rule 
does not give the Administrative Law Judge unbridled discretion to 
determine the existence of such issues, but rather definitively 
states that "Significant medical issues are involved where there 
are: (a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical 
impairment which vary more than 5% of the whole person...." 
It cannot be disputed that this case clearly contains 
conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which 
vary by more than 5% of the whole person. The Administrative Law 
Judge and the Industrial Commission take the position that there is 
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no industrially related impairment from the cervical injuries. Dr. 
Church has indicated that there is a 20% rating. The difference 
between 0% and 20% is more than 5% so medical panel referral is 
mandatory. 
The second instance where panel referral is mandatory appears 
in R490-l-9(b): "Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary 
total cutoff date which vary more than 90 days..." Clearly there 
are conflicting medical opinions on the length of time Mr. 
Kleinsmith should be off. Dr. Albrand has stated that he is off 
indefinitely ("permanently, totally disabled") and Dr. Holbrook in 
his IME has stated that, "The industrial accident did not 
specifically cause any identifiable pathological process." (R. at 
69). The Commission has not awarded any compensation benefits 
whatsoever. Thus, the difference between zero days off due to the 
industrial accident and being off indefinitely is clearly a 
variance of more than 90 days. 
The third criteria for mandatory medical panel referral is the 
most evident one that Mr. Kleinsmith satisfies, R490-l-9(c): 
"Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $2,000.00." 
Since the Respondent has not paid anything on this claim, all of 
Mr. Kleinsmith's medical bills remain outstanding (or had to be 
paid by a secondary institution). His $13,000.00 neck surgery, 
incurred due to his industrial accident, remains outstanding and is 
clearly more than $2,000.00. 
Thus, Mr. Kleinsmith satisfies not one, but all three criteria 
for mandatory medical panel referral. This accentuates the gravity 
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of the medical and compensation issues of this case which the ALJ 
and the Commission have casually ignored by summarily dismissing 
his claim without expert, mandatory medical input. 
In this case, the causal connection between the work-related 
injury and the Applicant's permanent, total disability, although 
clear to Petitioner, was at least uncertain to the Commission and 
failure to refer the matter to a Medical Panel was overt error. 
The ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR REVIEW should be reversed and the 
matter remanded with directions to refer the matter to a Medical 
Panel since failure to do was in direct conflict with Industrial 
Commission practice and rule. The failure to obtain a Medical 
Panel opinion resulted in the Administrative Law Judge lacking 
essential and necessary information to adjudicate Petitioner's 
claim. The ALJ supplanted a required medical panel decision with 
a medical assessment of her own, while also totally ignoring a 
concrete medical causation letter by treating physician Otmar 
Albrand. (R. at 127). 
CONCLUSION/STATEMENT OF RELIEF SOUGHT 
This case presents substantial evidence that Petitioner's 
permanent, total disability status is legally and medically the 
result of his industrial injury. Dr. Albrand's report on that 
point is clear and unquestionable. The Industrial Commission, in 
denying benefits to the Petitioner, has ignored and failed to apply 
the entire beneficent purpose of the workers' compensation system. 
The failure to refer Petitioner to a Medical Panel is a 
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glaring error and calls in and of itself for reversal and remand. 
In a case such as this, the referral to a Medical Panel was not 
only appropriate but required under the Industrial Commission's own 
Rules and Regulations. 
Therefore, it is respectfully requested that this Court 
reverse the final agency action, and remand with instructions to 
either award him benefits based on the uncontroverted facts and 
medical evidence presented, or in the alternative, to convene a 
Medical Panel. 
The Court of Appeals should also hold that the Industrial 
Commission has exceeded its authority by promulgating a rule which 
has a standard higher than that of a statute. . That is, the 
language in Rule R490-l-17(c) [again, now known as R568-1-17(c)] 
requiring injured workers to prove that their industrial injury is 
a "significant cause" of their disability should be invalidated as 
there is no such requirement or authority for this in the 
permanent, total disability statute, U.C.A. Section 35-1-67. 
DATED this 8th day of January, 1994. 
BRIAN D. KELM, Esq. 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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35-1-67, Permanent total disability — Amount of payments 
Rehabi Mtation. 
(1) In cases of permanent total disability caused by an industrial 
accident, the employee shall receive compensation as outlined in this 
section. Permanent total disability for purposes of this chapter requires a 
finding by the commission of total disability, as measured by the substance of 
the sequential decision-making process of the Social Security Administration 
under Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations as revised. The commission 
shall adopt rules that conform to the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under 20 C.F.R. 
Subsections 404.1520 (b), (c), (d), (e), and (f) (1) and (2), as revised. 
(2) For permanent total disability compensation during the initial 
312-week entitlement, compensation shall be 66-2/3% of the employee's average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury, limited as follows: 
(a) Compensation per week may not be more than 85% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury. 
(b) Compensation per week may not be less than the sum of $45 per week, 
plus $5 for a dependent spouse, plus $5 for each dependent child under the age 
of 18 years, up to a maximum of four such dependent minor children, but not 
exceeding the maximum established in Subsection (a) nor exceeding the average 
weekly wage of the employee at the time of the injury. 
(c) After the initial 312 weeks, the minimum weekly compensation rate 
under Subsection (b) shall be 36% of the current state average weekly wage, 
rounded to the nearest dollar. 
(3) The employer or its insurance carrier is liable for the initial 312 
weeks of permanent total disability compensation except as outlined in Section 
35-1-69. The employer or its insurance carrier may not be required to pay 
compensation for any combination of disabilities of any kind, as provided in 
this section and Sections 35-1-65, 35-1-65.1, and 35-1-66, in excess of the 
amount of compensation payable over 312 weeks at the applicable permanent 
total disability compensation rate under Subsection (2). Any overpayment of 
this compensation shall be reimbursed to the employer or its insurance carrier 
by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund and shall be paid out of the Employers1 
Reinsurance Fund's liability to the employee. 
(4) After an employee has received compensation from his employer, its 
insurance carrier, or the Employers' Reinsurance Fund for any combination of 
disabilities amounting to 312 weeks of compensation at the applicable 
EXHIBIT A page 1 
permanent total disability compensation rate, the Employers' Reinsurance Fund 
shall pay all remaining permanent total disability compensation. Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund payments shall commence immediately after the employer or its 
insurance carrier has satisfied its liability under Subsection (3) or Section 
35-1-69. Notwithstanding the minimum rate established in Subsection (2), the 
compensation payable by the Employers' Reinsurance Fund shall be reduced, to 
the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the Social 
Security retirement benefits received by the employee during the same period. 
(5) A finding by the commission of permanent total disability shall in 
all cases be tentative and not final until all of the following proceedings 
have occurred: 
(a) Upon tentatively determining that an employee is permanently and 
totally disabled, the commission shall, unless otherwise agreed by the 
parties, refer the employee to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under 
the State Board for Vocational Education for rehabilitation training. The 
commission shall order that an amount be paid out of the Employers' 
Reinsurance Fund provided for by Subsection 35-1-68 (1), not to exceed $3,000 
for use in the rehabilitation and training of the employee. 
(b) If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation under the State Board for 
Vocational Education certifies to the commission in writing that the employee 
has fully cooperated with that agency in its efforts to rehabilitate the 
employee, and in the opinion of the agency, the employee is not able to be 
rehabilitated, the commission shall, after notice to the parties, hold a 
hearing to consider the agency's opinion as well as other evidence regarding 
rehabilitation. The parties may waive the right to a hearing. If a 
preponderance of the evidence shows that successful rehabilitation is not 
possible, the commission shall order that the employee be paid weekly 
permanent total disability compensation benefits. The period of benefits 
commences on the date the employee became permanently totally disabled, as 
determined by the commission based on the facts and evidence, and ends with 
the death of the employee or when the employee is capable of returning to 
regular, steady work. In any case where an employee has been rehabilitated or 
the employee's rehabilitation is possible, but where the employee has some 
loss of bodily function, the award shall be for permanent partial disability. 
An employee is not entitled to compensation, unless the employee fully 
cooperates with any rehabilitation effort under this section. 
(6) The loss or permanent and complete loss of the use of both hands, 
both arms, both feet, both legs, both eyes, or any combination of two such 
body members constitutes total and permanent disability, to be compensated 
according to this section. No tentative finding of permanent total disability 
is required in any such instance, (as last amended by Chapter 12, Laws of Utah 
1988 Second Special Session) 
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R490-1-9. Guidelines for Utilization of Medical Panel. 
Pursuant to Section 35-1-77, U.C.A., the Commission adopts the following 
guidelines in determining the necessity of submitting a case to a medical panel: 
A. A panel will be utilized by the Administrative Law Judge where: 
1. One or more significant medical issues may be involved. Generally a 
significant medical issue must be shown by conflicting medical reports. 
Significant medical issues are involved when there are: 
* (a) Conflicting medical reports of permanent physical impairment which vary 
more than 5% of the whole person, 
+ (b) Conflicting medical opinions as to the temporary total cutoff date 
which vary more than 90 days, and/or 
it (c) Medical expenses in controversy amounting to more than $2,000. 
B. A hearing on objections to the panel report may be scheduled if there 
is a proffer of conflicting medical testimony showing a need to clarify the 
medical panel report. Where there is a proffer of new written conflicting 
medical evidence, the Administrative Law Judge may, in lieu of a hearing, 
re-submit the new evidence to the panel for consideration and clarification. 
C. The Administrative Law Judge may authorize an injured worker to be 
examined by another physician for the purpose of obtaining a further medical 
examination or evaluation pertaining to the medical issues involved, and to 
obtain a report addressing these medical issues in all cases where: 
1. The treating physician has failed or refused to give an impairment 
rating, 
2. The employer or doctor considers the claim to be non-industrial, and/or 
3. A substantial injustice may occur without such further evaluation. 
D. Any expenses of the study and report of a medical panel or medical 
consultant and of their appearance at a hearing, as well as any expenses for 
further medical examination or evaluation, as directed by the Administrative Law 
Judge, shall be paid out of the Employers1 Reinsurance Fund. 
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R490-1-17* Permanent Total Disability. 
T. The Commission is required under Section 35-1-67, U.C.A., to make a 
finding of total disability as measured by the substance of the sequential 
decision-making process of the Social Security Administration under Title 20 of 
the Code of Federal Regulations, as revised. The use of the term "substance of 
the sequential decision-making process" is deemed to confer some latitude on the 
Commission in exercising a degree of discretion in making its findings relative 
to permanent total disability. The Commission does not interpret the code 
section to eliminate the requirement that a finding by the Commission in 
permanent and total disability shall in all cases be tentative and not final 
until rehabilitation training and/or evaluation has been accomplished. 
B. In the event that the Social Security Administration or its designee 
has made, or is in the process of making, a determination of disability under the 
foregoing process, the Commission may use this information in lieu of instituting 
the process on its own behalf. 
(c?) In evaluating industrial claims in which the injured worker has 
qualified for Social Security disability benefits, the Commission will determine 
if a significant cause of the disability is the claimant's industrial accident 
or some other unrelated cause or causes. 
D. To make a tentative finding of permanent total disability the 
Commission shall rely upon and be guided by the rules of disability determination 
published by the Social Security Administration Office of Disability publication 
SSA Pub. No. 64-014, as amended. In short, the sequential decision making 
process referred to requires a series of questions and evaluations to be made in 
sequence. These are: 
1. Is the claimant engaged in a substantial gainful activity? 
2. Does the claimant have a medically severe impairment? 
3. Does the severe impairment meet or equal the listed impairments in 
Appendix 1 of SSA Pub. No. 64-014? 
4. Does the impairment prevent the claimant from doing his or her previous 
work? * 
E. After a tentative finding of permanent total disability, the applicant 
shall be referred to the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation for evaluation and 
rehabilitation work-up. If the Utah State Office of Rehabilitation determines 
that the applicant is unable to do any other work because of his age, education, 
and previous work experience, and as a result of an industrial accident, there 
shall be a hearing to review the determination of the Utah State Office of 
Rehabilitation and any objections thereto, unless the parties waive the right to 
a hearing. 
F. After a hearing, or waiver of the hearing by the parties, the 
Commission shall issue an order finding or denying permanent total disability 
based upon the preponderance of the evidence and with due consideration of the 
vocational factors in combination with the residual functional capacity as 
detailed in Appendix 2 of SSA Pub. No. 64-014. 
KEY: workers1 compensation, time, administrative procedure, filing deadlines 
1990 35-1-1 et seq. 
35-2-1 et seq. 
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